To bring students up-to-date with the state-of-the-art in industrial organization theory. Upon completion of the course, students should be able to read, comprehend, and critically assess current theoretical articles in leading journals in this field (like RAND Journal of Economics, Journal of Industrial Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization).
3 ECTS
Industrial Organization, level first-year Research Master (e.g. Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press, Cambridge).
tba
Cartels and Leniency Programs - Schoonbeek
Horizontal Mergers - Schoonbeek
Two-Stage models: Managerial Incentives - Schoonbeek
Search Models - Haan
Advertising Models - Haan
Two-Sided Markets - Haan
Lecture 1: Cartels and Leniency Programs
Aubert, C., Rey, P. and W. Kovacic (2006), “The impact of leniency and
whistleblowing programs on cartels”, International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 24(6), 1241-1266.
Motta, M. and M. Polo (2003), “Leniency programs and cartel prosecution”,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 347-379.
Spagnolo, G. (2004), “Divide et Impere: optimal leniency programs”, CEPR
Discussion paper 4840.
Lecture 2: Horizontal Mergers
Davidson, C. and R.J. Deneckere (1985), “Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition”, RAND Journal of Economics, 16, 473-486.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), “Horizontal mergers, an equilibrium analysis”, American Economic Review, 80, 107-125.
Perry, M.K. and R. Porter (1985), “Oligopoly and the incentive for horizontal merger”, American Economic Review, 75, 219-227.
Salant, S., S. Switzer and R. Reynolds, (1983), “Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 185-199.
Lecture 3: Two-Stage Models: Managerial Incentives
Barcena-Ruiz, J.C., and M.P. Espinosa (1996), “Long-term or short-term managerial incentive contracts”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5, 343-359.
Basu, K. (1995), “Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: an explanation based on managerial incentives”, Economics Letters, 49, 459-464.
Fershtman C., and K.L. Judd (1987), “Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly”, American Economic Review, 77, 927-940.
Miller, N.H. and A.I. Pazgal (2001), “The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation”, RAND Journal of Economics, 32, 282-301.
Mujumdar, S. and D. Pal (2007), “Strategic managerial incentives in a two-period Cournot model”, Games and Economic Behavior, 58, 338-353.
Spagnolo, G. (2005), “Managerial incentives and collusive behavior”, European Economic Review, 49, 1501-1523.
Lecture 4: Search Models
Burdett, K. and K. Judd (1983), “Equilibrium Price Dispersion”, Econometrica, 51, 955-969.
Diamond, P.A. (1971), “A Model of Price Adjustment”. Journal of Economic Theory, 3, 156-168.
Stahl, D.O. (1989), “Oligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search”, American Economic Review, 79, pp. 700-712.
Varian, H.R. (1980), “A Model of Sales.” American Economic Review, 70, 651-659.
Lecture Notes.
Lecture 5: Advertising
Bagwell, K. (2007), “The Economic Analysis of Advertising”, Chapter 2 in M. Armstrong and R.H. Porter (eds.), Handbook Of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, Elsevier. A longer earlier version is available here.
Butters G. (1977), “Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and
Advertising Prices”, Review of Economic Studies, 44, 465-491.
Grossman, G.M. and C. Shapiro (1984), “Informative Advertising with
Differentiated Products”, Review of Economic Studies, 51, 63-81.
Lecture Notes.
Lecture 6: Two-Sided Markets
Armstrong, M. (2004), Competition in Two-Sided Markets, mimeo, University College London.
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2003), “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1, 990-1029.
Rochet, J.-C. and J. Tirole (2004), Two-sided markets: an overview, mimeo, Toulouse.