NAKE.03.105: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

 

A.J.J. Talman (UvT)

G. van der Laan (VU)

 

Objectives

To learn about the basic techniques of evolutionary game theory and its applications.

Contents

Neoclassical economics assumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through the most complex economic problems. However, in real world, people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes shortsighted and do not act rationally. However, the cumulative experiences of the individuals in the population coalesce over time into customs, norms and institutions that govern economic and social life. In the course we discuss the evolutions of such institutions, using results from evolutionary game theory and the theory of stochastic systems. Also a variety of examples is presented.

Prerequisites

A basis knowledge of game theory.

 

Literature

1. Weibull, J.W. (1995), Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA

2. Samuelson, S. (1997), Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA

3. Anderlini, L. and A. Ianni (1996), "Path dependence and learning from neighbors", Games and Economic Behavior 13, 141-177

4. Eshel, I., L. Samuelson and A. Shaked (1998), "Altruists, egoists, and hooligans in a local interaction model", American Economic         Review 88, 157-179

 

Program

12 March (Van der Laan): Noncooperative Game Theory (1, Chapter 1)

19 March (Talman): Evolutionary Stability (1, Chapter 2)

26 March (Talman): The Replicator Dynamics (1, Chapter 3)

2 April (Talman): A Model of Evolution: The Aspiration and Imitation Model (2, Chapter 3)

16 April (Van der Laan): Evolutionary Behavior in Local Interaction Models (3 + 4)

 

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